

14 November 1947

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, R & E**

**SUBJECT:** ORE Intelligence Production

**ENCLOSURES:** (A) Pertinent Excerpts from Directives Setting Forth the Mission of O.R.E.

- (C) Summary Case History of O.R.E.'s "on the Books" early in July, 1947.
- (D) Weekly Articles Selected at Random among Those Considered of Sufficient Importance to Justify Preparation of a Special Estimate (O.R.E. Series).
- (E) Analysis of Work-Week for Selected CIA Intelligence Officers.
- (F) Draft ORE Memorandum Planning for Production of ORE Estimates.

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1. The purpose of this memorandum is to review briefly some matters concerning ORE intelligence production which have been discussed from time to time with the Assistant Director. The vital question to be answered would be: taking ORE as it is, with its present facilities, is the organization putting first things first regarding the fulfillment of its assigned mission? If we accept as axiomatic that the preparation of searching analyses of situations which actually or potentially affect the security of the United States is a vital function of C.I.A., and more particularly of O.R.E., then it is believed the answer to the question is "No." (See Enclosure "A" for pertinent excerpts from directives setting forth the mission of O.R.E.)

2. During the first months of its existence, it was understood that ORE would be obliged to fulfill only such parts of its mission as were possible under limitations, largely limitations of personnel. The production program was, nevertheless, designed in such a way as to allow for full accomplishment of the mission at the earliest possible date.

3. Though considerable progress has been made in recent months in meeting the personnel requirements of ORE, production of staff intelligence has not increased perceptibly. It has been disappointing both as to quantity (a measure of Branch initiative or willingness to act on Staff suggestion), and quality (a measure of Branch capabilities to produce a good estimate). (Regional Branch 1 November figures show following increase over 1 April: P-6 to P-8, 44%; P-1 to P-5, 52%; GAF's, 32%; making over-all increase 49%. See Enclosure "B".)

By way of illustration, there follows a recapitulation of the Special Estimates (ORE's) produced, exclusive of those which were not acceptable for publication, in the sixteen months from July 1948 through October 1947:

<u>Branch</u>	<u>Total No.</u>	<u>Originated</u>	<u>Originated in</u>	<u>Written mainly out-</u>
	<u>Disseminated</u>	<u>within Branch</u>	<u>Staff or Outside</u>	<u>side Regional Branch</u>
NE	5	0	5	4
NE/A	7	2	5	0
FE/P	4	3	1	0
EE/USSR	4	1	3	3
NB	0	0	0	-
LA	2	2	0	0
Branch sub-total	22	6	14	7
Consultants Panel	5			
Total for ORE	27			

Note: Within the last six months, the only ORE's prepared in the Regional Branches on their own initiative are two in FE/P and one in NE/A. For the case history of the ORE's "on the Books" early in July see Enclosure "C".

4. With regard to Situation Reports, not only have they appeared slowly, but the Branches have shown themselves unable to meet "realistic" deadlines set by themselves last August. (See ORE Memorandum No. 40-47 dated 27 August and monthly reports submitted in accordance with ORE Instruction No. 51-47 dated 1 October.) Following is the production, by Branch, to date:

<u>Branch</u>	<u>SR Reports</u>	<u>SR Reports</u>
	<u>Scheduled</u>	<u>Disseminated</u>
NE	2	None
NE/A	4	2
FE/P	2	1
EE/USSR	2	1
NB	3	2
LA	1	None
Total for ORE	15	6

5. Short of making a definitive survey in all Branches, it would be presumptuous of this Group to make sweeping generalizations regarding the effects of a numerical shortage of personnel; the shortage of personnel properly qualified to produce acceptable staff intelligence; the improper use of available personnel; over-extension during the organizational build-up; and, lack of effective supervision and instruction. But it is submitted that all these factors, common as they are to any organization, exist in ORE and contribute to the cause of our present concern.

6. It is impossible to expect even a modest flow of staff intelligence when only marginal time is allocated to it, often by default. (Probably not in excess of 10% of the regular work-week of professional personnel at a level where staff intelligence must be produced is now devoted to this purpose, and this intermittently. See Enclosure "E".) The very nature of inflexible, recurrent demands of the Daily and Weekly has meant that all types of work take second place to it. Further, it also provides the line of least resistance for the Branches to take when confronted with a development which wants analysing. (An illustration of this may be seen in Enclosure "D".)

7. The true distinction between Current and Staff Intelligence seems not to be perceived by the Branches whose production would appear to indicate that they consider a given subject sufficiently covered as soon as a Weekly, or even a Daily, has been published on it. Actually, Weeklies and ORE's are by no means mutually exclusive items of production; yet the assumption that the one precludes the other has been a deterrent to production of staff intelligence. Perhaps the underlying reason is that the composition of an ORE is painstaking, laborious, and dependent on sustained analysis not to be expected of supervisory personnel pressed with the urgency of daily routine; while new or untrained personnel are incapable of it. Again, knowledge of the ponderous process of interdepartmental coordination -- a process which often results in a report which has lost its timeliness -- often acts as a deterrent to an analyst who knows that the effect of his work will be lost if it is delayed. Yet it must be recognised that this very coordination gives the final report greater authority and is the very fulfillment of the function which Central Intelligence was designed to perform.

8. It therefore appears that the present ORE effort is concentrated on routine interpretation of diplomatic reporting (Daily), swift evaluation of a number of dispatches and other evidence (Weekly and Special Evaluation), and various forms of intellectual incest (Weekly Presentations and preparation of reports for internal consumption). As a result, the initiative for the preparation of ORE Special Estimates, now tacitly acknowledged to reside in the Branches, has, with minor exceptions, not been taken. According to directives in force, the "coordination and adjustment of production priorities" by the Plans and Policy Staff, plus the "determination of the need for a report" by the Estimates Group, plus the exercise of "responsibility for the production of requisite reports" by the Branches should produce results. Except for sporadic production to meet outside requests, it seldom does.

9. Continued lack of improvement in ORE ability to meet deadlines and improve production both as to volume and quality, will have an increasingly greater effect on future production. For example: on 12 August the Assistant Director in answer to a query, wrote to the Director committing ORE to produce certain SR reports as a matter of priority. To date not one draft of the four now overdue has yet reached the Estimates Group for review. Apart from not meeting this commitment, this and total lack of ORE's from certain key countries (USSR and Satellites) will undoubtedly retard the preparation of Regional and Global studies.

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10. It all seems to come to this: steps should be taken to set down priorities, and further steps should be taken to insure that operations proceed on the basis of those priorities. When the priority for ORE's has been decided, their production must be systematized, for the present method of determining what is to be written about and what is not borders on the haphazard. Accompanying this, provisions must be made to insure that routine or relatively trivial tasks not be allowed to impinge on the time needed for the primary function of C.I.A. Further, with plans to improve volume must also come plans to improve quality, and all this must be done in a manner which will not destroy one of the greatest assets ORE now has: the enthusiasm of the great majority of its personnel for, and their faith in, the fundamental objectives of Central Intelligence.

11. Recommendations.

- a. That, as a preliminary step to the systematic production of ORE Special Estimates, the Assistant Director release the draft memorandum: Planning for Production of ORE Estimates (Enclosure "F").
- b. That it be accepted in principle that, as a minimum, each Regional Branch will be required to produce one Estimate each month. (This will be production in addition to any outside requests made.)
- c. That the Assistant Director ascertain the views of the Director regarding the advisability of continuing the Weekly Presentation, this with a view to substituting therefor:
  - (1) The practice of briefing the Director on an "on call" basis; and
  - (2) A Weekly Seminar designed to up-grade ORE personnel engaged in the preparation of staff intelligence.

PAUL A. BOREL  
Acting Chief, Estimates Group  
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## PERTINENT EXCERPTS FROM DIRECTIVES SETTING FORTH THE MISSION OF ORG

## REFERENCES:

a.  
b.  
c.  
d.  
e

1. By the President's letter of 22 January 1946, the Director of Central Intelligence is directed to "accomplish the correlation and evaluation of intelligence relating to the national security, and the appropriate dissemination within the Government of the resulting strategic and national policy intelligence." (Reference g.)

2. "Within the framework of the mission of the Central Intelligence Agency, . . . . the mission of the Office of Reports and Estimates is to: Produce and present national intelligence utilizing all available intelligence and intelligence information in order to: (a) Provide the National Intelligence required for national policy and operational decisions and national planning and (b) Assure to the maximum practicable degree that the United States will not be strategically surprised by any foreign nation or combination of nations due to being inadequately informed...." (Reference g.)

3. "In carrying out its mission, the Office of Reports and Estimates. . . . will . . . . Prepare, keep current, and upon approval by the Director, execute an Intelligence Production and Presentation Plan in order to assure coordination of the production of intelligence relating to the national security and its timely presentation to the President, the National Security Council.... and to such other agencies of the Government as may be directed . . ." (Reference g.)

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4. "The following Intelligence Production and Presentation Plan has been approved by the Director . . . Staff Intelligence will produce and issue analyses prepared by specific direction or in response to a specific authorized request, or on the initiative of ORE as it perceives the occasion in its continuing review of the world situation. . . ." (Reference b.)

5. "In order to insure that the production of intelligence is accomplished efficiently; and that such intelligence is responsive to both current and long-range requirements for the national security; and to delineate the Staff, Group and Branch responsibilities in connection therewith; the following procedures are prescribed. . .

"Plans and Policy Staff is charged with primary responsibility for . . . the overall . . . preparation . . . of the Intelligence Production plan . . . and for the coordination and adjustment of priorities for production of basic, current and staff intelligence to prevent conflicts and to insure effective utilization of production capacities.

"Estimates Group . . . has staff responsibility for . . . determination of the need for, and the scope and terms of reference of, projected CIA intelligence reports and the allocation of responsibilities to the appropriate Branches or Groups of the Consultants Panel for the preparation of such reports. Also the establishment of priorities and deadlines to govern the production of such reports.

"Branches and Groups of the Consultants Panel . . . have responsibility for recommending immediate modification of approved production plans based upon requirements arising

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from their continuous review of significant trends and developments and for initiating the prompt production of requisite unscheduled reports, including coordination with the appropriate Staff, Branch and Group." (Reference d.)

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SUMMARY CASE HISTORY OF O.R.E.'S "ON THE BOOKS" EARLY IN JULY 1947

- a. Greek Political Instability. Suspended as unacceptable for publication following completion of several drafts.
- b. Repercussions Attending the Disposition of the Italian Colonies.  
Disseminated 29 August as "Significant Considerations Attending the Disposition of the Italian African Colonies", after having been entirely re-written, in fact largely written, in the Estimates Group.
- c. Probable Soviet and Soviet-Inspired Reactions to a US Aid Program for Italy. Disseminated 18 July. This was Global Survey redraft of WE - EE/USSR comments to SWNEC paper re Foreign Aid Requirements.
- d. Progress of Soviet Program in Eastern Europe. Project initiated 10 December 1946. Indefinitely deferred by Branch pending completion of SR Series on Eastern European countries.
- e. Probable Effects of Stalin's Death or Disability. Project initiated 23 December 1946. Indefinitely deferred in November by Assistant Director after several unacceptable drafts were prepared.
- f. Analysis of the Monnet Plan for the French Economy. Project initiated 30 December 1946, but overtaken by events owing to length of time taken in preparation of a draft. Now cancelled.
- g.
- h. The Kurdish Problem. Project suspended per request of NE/A.
- i. Spanish Governmental Prospects. Project initiated by WE Branch along in April. Estimates Group received an acceptable redraft on 10 November.

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**WEEKLY ARTICLES\* SELECTED AT RANDOM AMONG THOSE CONSIDERED OF SUFFICIENT IMPORTANCE TO JUSTIFY PREPARATION OF A SPECIAL ESTIMATE (O.R.E. SERIES)**

<u>Article</u>	<u>Length in Pages</u>
<u>WE</u>	
Italian Communist Intentions	2.1
Forces Undermining Franco's Position	2.0
Implications of the French Elections	1.5
<u>ME/A</u>	
Immediate Problems Confronting India and Pakistan	1.1
Possible Pro-Soviet Alignment of the Dominion of India	1.5
Arab Reaction to Possible Palestine Regimes	4.5
<u>FE/P</u>	
Present French Policy in Indochina	1.5
Soviet Proposal for US-USSR Withdrawal from Korea	2.2
Chinese Military and Economic Developments	1.1
<u>EE/USSR</u>	
Strategy of Soviet Delay in Treaty Ratification	2.1
Yugoslav Strategy in Trieste	1.0
Soviet Intentions in Austria	1.7
Soviet Plans for the Czech Munitions Industry	1.8
Soviet Preparations to Gain Control in Greece	1.2
<div style="border: 1px solid black; height: 40px; width: 100%;"></div>	
<u>LA</u>	
Issues before Rio Conference	2.7
Peron's Political and Economic Problems	1.5
<u>Consultants Panel</u>	
Analysis of Probable UNGA Vote on Palestine	2.7
Rail Transport in Rumania	2.5
<div style="border: 1px solid black; height: 15px; width: 100%;"></div>	
Prospects for a Multilateral Air Treaty	1.5

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\* Articles appearing in the Weekly within the last three months.

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1. The World Federation of Trade Unions. Project initiated 12 May 1947.  
Estimates Group awaiting first draft. Present prospects are that none  
will be forthcoming until after the first of the year.

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OFFICE OF REPORTS AND ESTIMATES

O. R. E. Memorandum No.

November 1947


SUBJECT: Planning for Production of ORE Estimates

In order to systematize the production of intelligence coverage of important situations, monthly meetings of Regional Branch and Group Chiefs will be held to plan the future production of Special Estimates (ORE's).

At these meetings, each Branch and Group Chief will be prepared to submit ideas for estimates. Following any necessary discussion, topics to be covered will be selected and deadlines will be set for the submission of drafts to the Estimates Group.

These meetings will be held on the first Wednesday of each month at 1500 in Conference Room 2001.

The first such meeting will be 3 December.

  
Assistant Director  
Reports and Estimates

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